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AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF MONTANA
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
Daniel Jones*
In adopting a strict liability regime for products liability, the Montana
Supreme Court stated, "strict liability was evolved to place liability on the
party primarily responsible for the injury occurring, that is, the manufac-
turer of the defective product."' The Court's de facto policy statement
brings into question whether products liability is effective or even desirable
as applied in Montana. Although the efficacy of legal regimes is often ana-
lyzed in the context of procedural justice, substantive justice, equity, truth,
or other similar concepts, the purpose of this article is to use a more objec-
tive standard-economic analysis. An economic analysis of the law aims to
determine whether laws promote rational behavior in pursuit of consistent
ends by efficient means. 2 Montana products liability law has aspects that
result in both efficient and inefficient outcomes. Courts have construed the
statutory and common law schemes such that the product liability rules pro-
mote rational behavior and efficient outcomes because they direct liability
to the party who has the best ability to avoid the injury. But the affirmative
defenses to Montana products liability claims do not promote rational be-
havior and have the potential to result in perverse incentives for both manu-
facturers and consumers.
Part I of this article discusses why efficiency is an appropriate standard
by which to analyze behavior for a negligence and strict liability legal re-
gime. Negligence is included in the analysis because the economic model
for strict liability is partially based on the negligence model, and Montana
products liability uses aspects of both.3 In Part II, a basic economic model
for both negligence and strict liability will be introduced and explained. In
Part III, the models will be applied to the current products liability regime
in Montana to determine whether the Montana rules result in, or have the
potential to result in, efficient outcomes. Part IV of this article will summa-
rize the findings and conclude that while most aspects of Montana's prod-
* B.A., 2006 Harvard College, M.B.A. 2009, J.D. 2009, University of Montana. Associate, Jar-
dine, Stephenson, Blewett & Weaver, Great Falls, Montana, 2009-Present. The author would like to
give special thanks to Professor Beth Brennan and Brett Bollinger for their assistance in preparing this
article.
1. Brandenburger v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 513 P.2d 268, 273 (Mont. 1973) (citing
Lechuga, Inc. v. Montgomery, 467 P.2d 256, 261 (Ariz. App. 1970) (Jacobsen, J., concurring)).
2. Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics I (Scott, Foresman & Co. 1988).
3. Cooter & Ulen, supra n. 2, at 347.
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ucts liability regime have the potential to lead to efficient outcomes, the
affirmative defenses do not.
I. EcONOMIc EFFICIENCY
Perhaps the most famous insertion of economic analysis into law came
from Judge Learned Hand who stated, "if the probability be called P; the
injury, L; and the burden, B; liability depends upon whether B is less than L
multiplied by P: i.e., whether B [sic] less than PL." 4 While he was referring
to negligence as opposed to strict liability, negligence is still a useful place
to begin because the strict liability model builds off the negligence model.
Judge Learned Hand was attempting to create a framework for analyz-
ing whether the acts of an individual constitute negligence based on the
costs individual actors were imposing on themselves and others; that is, if
the cost of the potential injury was far greater than what it would cost to
avoid the danger, the potential tortfeasor should incur the burden of avoid-
ing the injury. From Judge Hand's perspective, liability should accrue to
the tortfeasor when the tortfeasor fails to properly account for the negative
external costs, PL, his actions will impose on others.5 Alternatively, if the
tortfeasor internalizes those costs by taking additional precautions (i.e.,
B>PL), he will not be liable for any injuries caused by his actions. The
purpose of this framework was to determine when it was appropriate to
force tortfeasors to recognize the external costs of their actions and to hold
them liable when they imposed the external costs on others. From an eco-
nomic perspective, a negligence legal regime is necessary because rational,
self-interested decision-makers will account for only the personal costs of
their actions.6 Such myopic behavior would leave the rest of society bear-
ing the burden of tortfeasors' acts. Negligence law, therefore, attempts to
prescribe a level of precaution that all actors must adhere to if they wish to
escape liability.7
From an economic point of view, negligence law attempts to shift the
burden of the negative externality caused by the tortfeasor's actions from
the victim to the tortfeasor if the tortfeasor's actions are not within the le-
gally mandated level of precaution.8 In other words, the tortfeasor must
exhibit an appropriate amount of self-control to avoid liability. The ques-
tion then becomes, what is the appropriate level of precaution, or what is
the efficiency-promoting level of precaution? The appropriate level of pre-
4. U S. v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
5. Id.
6. Ariel Porat, Offsetting Risks, 106 Mich. L. Rev. 243, 244-245 (2007).
7. Id.
8. Id.
Vol. 71158
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caution is that which minimizes the total costs to all of society for any act.9
The level of precaution that minimizes total social costs would presumably
lead to the most consistent and rational behavior.' 0 In terms of strict liabil-
ity, the same cost-minimizing outcome is desirable." Therefore, the deter-
minative factor in establishing whether a legal regime results in efficient
outcomes is the level of precaution imposed by the regime. I now turn to
how the appropriate level of precaution is determined and who bears the
burden of costs associated with precaution.
II. AN EcONOMIC MODEL
The strict liability economic model is based on the negligence model.
Therefore, the negligence standard will be defined first. When the rights of
one individual are violated by another, the violated individual forcibly bears
some costs of the violator's actions. The violated party is subject to the
negative external costs created by the violator, and the violator is subject
only to the costs incurred in taking precaution. Therefore, there are two
general types of costs: the costs the tortfeasor can recognize (internal/pre-
caution costs) and the costs imposed on other people as a result of the
tortfeasor's actions (externallaccident costs). 12 The "external costs" are the
accident costs borne by the plaintiff and any other member of society af-
fected by the tortfeasor's actions. "Internal costs" are primarily the costs
associated with the level of precaution incorporated by the tortfeasor. The
sum of the internal costs and external costs are the total costs imposed upon
society, or "social costs."t 3 Efficiency dictates that the rules of tort liability
should be structured so as to minimize the sum of precaution (internal
costs) plus accident costs (external costs). 14 Put simply, the efficiency stan-
dard attempts to minimize the total social costs. The social cost function is
the mathematical function that embodies the sum of the total social cost, the
minimization of which establishes the efficient amount of precaution.15
The tortfeasor's precautionary costs change as a function of the
tortfeasor's self-prescribed level of precaution. These costs could include
the cost of driving slower instead of faster, the cost of keeping commercial
coffee at a lower temperature,' 6 or the cost of constructing a taller outfield
fence.17 The precautionary cost is a function of the acts the tortfeasor is
9. Cooter & Ulen, supra n. 2, at 347.
10. This article assumes that people are rational.
11. Cooter & Ulen, supra n. 2, at 368.
12. Id. at 348.
13. Id. at 349.
14. Id. at 347.
15. Id. at 348-349.
16. Holowaty v. McDonald's Corp., 10 F. Supp. 2d 1078, 1082-1083 (D. Minn. 1998).
17. Bolton v. Stone [1951] AC. 850, [1951] 1 All ER 1078.
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taking. The amount of precaution, x, multiplied by the incremental cost of
precaution, w, determines the tortfeasor's total precautionary costs.' 8 For
example, each additional foot the tortfeasor raises the outfield fence has an
incremental cost. By multiplying the additional feet that the fence was
raised by the cost per foot, you get the total cost of precaution, wx. An
important quality of the cost of precaution, w, is that it is an increasing
linear function.19 As w or x increases, the total cost of precaution increases.
It is assumed that the cost of precaution is determined exclusive of any
negative external costs imposed on society. Put differently, the tortfeasor is
only interested in the costs imposed upon him.20
The social cost function also includes the external costs imposed on
others by the tortfeasor.21 It is important to note that external costs are
expressed as a probability. For example, an accident does not occur every
time an individual backs up his car without looking behind the car; there-
fore, the cost of that accident is best represented as a function of the
probability of the tortfeasor causing the accident. More precisely, the cost
of the negative externality will be the costs imposed on others, A, multiplied
by the probability of those costs being imposed given the amount of precau-
tion that is used by the tortfeasor, p(x). 2 2 The expected accident cost, or
external cost, is p(x)A. 23 The external costs include all costs that are im-
posed because of the tortfeasor's actions, including administration costs and
injury costs. For example, if the tortfeasor increases the height of the out-
field fence by 50 feet, the probability of an accident occurring, p(x), de-
creases. Therefore, the total expected accident cost, p(x)A, will decrease. 2 4
An important quality of the total expected accident cost is that it is a de-
creasing function of x, and the function is decreasing at a decreasing rate.2 5
For example, the function p(x)A behaves in the following fashion: raising
the outfield fence by an initial five feet decreases the probability of an acci-
dent by 10%. The next five feet the fence is raised decreases the probability
of an accident occurring by only 8%. The next five would result in only a
3% decrease, and so on until an additional five-foot increase would result in
the probability of an accident remaining the same. In other words, at some
18. Cooter & Ulen, supra n. 2, at 348-349.
19. Id. at 348.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 349.
23. Id.
24. By way of example, if the p(xi) is 50% and p(x2) is 25%, where x, represents a fence height of
10 feet and x2 represents a fence with a height of 12 feet, then, assuming an accident cost, A, of $100, the
expected accident cost with the level of precaution of x. is $50 and the expected accident cost with the
level of precaution of x2 is $25.
25. Cooter & Ulen, supra n. 2, at 348.
160 Vol. 71
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point, it is utterly impossible to knock the cricket ball over the fence and
knock out a little old lady. 26
The reason that the expected accident cost is used, as opposed to the
actual accident cost, is that negligence or strict liability should be proscrip-
tive. A rational individual should be able to determine whether the level of
precaution she chooses to use imposes an inefficient negative externality on
society, especially in the case of a manufacturer or seller of goods. The
efficient level of precaution should be as calculable as possible. This is
especially useful for product manufacturers because a particular product
will be placed in the market many times over. Being able to predict the
expected accident cost at each level of precaution should inform producers
how much precaution is necessary to avoid having the total social cost im-
posed or how much precaution is necessary to avoid liability.27
FIGURE 1-THE SOCIAL COST FUNCTION
SC = wx + p(x)A
x
Precaution
Source: Cooter & Ulen, supra n. 2, at 348.
The social costs function, SC, is the sum of the private costs incurred
by the tortfeasor and the potential accident costs imposed on society, SC =
wx + p(x)A. 28 The level of precaution, x, that minimizes the social costs
function is the efficient level of precaution (denoted "x*" in Figure 1).29 If
the courts desire socially efficient outcomes, the negligence rule should dic-
26. Bolton, [1951] AC. 850, [1951] 1 All ER 1078.
27. Cooter & Ulen, supra n. 2, at 358.
28. Id. at 348.
29. Id. at 349.
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tate that when the tortfeasor takes a level of precaution less than the effi-
cient level, courts will impose the external costs on the tortfeasor.30 This
imposition of cost informs the tortfeasor that it is cheaper to take more
precaution and avoid the imposition of costs than to try to impose those
costs on society by choosing a non-minimizing level of precaution. Mathe-
matically stated, when x is above or equal to the mandated level, the
tortfeasor will only be required to pay wx. However, if x falls below the
mandated level of precaution, the tortfeasor will be required to pay wx in
addition to the accident costs.3 ' The tortfeasor should continue to expend
money on precaution until the marginal cost of precaution w is equal to the
reduction in expected accident costs P'(x)A.32 Thus, the negligence regime
should dictate a level of precaution that, if not adhered to, gives rise to the
imposition of liability.
As a final note on negligence, it is important to keep in mind that
either party can act negligently. Under the various forms of the negligence
rule, all parties to an accident will have an incentive to produce an efficient
amount of precaution.33 Those parties who fail to produce sufficient
amounts of precaution will bear the burden of the resulting social costs of
the accident. 34 Therefore, both parties have the burden of producing an
efficient level of precaution. The notion that more than one party has the
ability to avoid danger is pivotal in determining whether a negligence stan-
dard or strict liability standard should be applied. For example, the little old
lady can climb to the top of the negligently short fence and then be hit in
the head with the cricket ball. Both parties acted negligently, and both par-
ties are subject to a separate negligence analysis. The situations in which
efficiency requires both parties to take precaution against accidents are
those of bilateral precaution.35 In contrast to bilateral precaution, unilateral
precaution incidents are those in which only one party can produce the effi-
cient amount of precaution. 36 In order to create incentives that direct indi-
viduals to act rationally and consistently, situations of unilateral precaution
must be controlled by strict liability regimes.37 In contrast, situations of
bilateral precaution create an incentive for both parties to use the efficient
amount of precaution and a negligence standard is appropriate.38 As the
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Cooter & Ulen, supra n. 2, at 365.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
162 Vol. 71
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negligence rule for bilateral precaution has been explored, I now turn to
incidents of unilateral precaution and strict liability.
As the focus of this article turns to strict liability, it is important to
keep in mind that the economic goal of strict liability is the same as that of
negligence: minimizing social costs. 39 Again, this is effectuated by reduc-
ing the internal costs incurred by the tortfeasor and the external costs im-
posed on the injured party. The practical difference between negligence
and strict liability arises in liability apportionment that results from an indi-
vidual being injured.
A strict liability regime imposes liability solely on the tortfeasor, with-
out regard to the level of precaution used by the tortfeasor.40 Framed in the
language of unilateral precaution, application of strict liability is appropri-
ate when one party could have used the efficient amount of precaution. If
efficiency requires only one party to act, strict liability does not impose a
legal standard of care, x, as negligence does, that releases the tortfeasor
from liability.41 In other words, if the plaintiff is injured, the defendant is
liable no matter what. However, where only one party can efficiently deter
the injury, the strict liability regime still results in the lowest social costs. 4 2
If strict liability does not impose a legal standard of care, what level of
precaution will a manufacturer choose? The social costs curve is a convex
curve, which is caused by wx having a positive slope and p(x)A having a
negative slope.43 As long as the manufacturer is forced to internalize the
external costs its actions impose upon society, the manufacturer will have
an incentive to minimize both the expected accident costs and its internal
precaution costs. This is so because the social costs curve, the sum of the
expected accident costs and the internal precaution costs, is convex and has
a minimum value. Therefore, the incentive for the manufacturer is to pro-
duce the amount of precaution, x, that minimizes the social costs function.44
An interesting result of this rule is that the potential victim has no incentive
to exhibit precaution against injuries subject to a strict liability rule.45
Efficiency is achieved when the appropriate legal standard is applied.
If either party can efficiently avoid harm, the smallest burden imposed on
all of society can be reached through application of a negligence standard.
On the other hand, assuming the situation dictates that only one party could
have caused the injury to be averted, a strict liability standard will lead to
39. Cooter & Ulen, supra n. 2, at 372.
40. Id. at 370.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 365.
43. Id. at 350.
44. This analysis assumes that the manufacturer is a profit-seeking/loss-avoiding entity.
45. Cooter & Ulen, supra n. 2, at 364-365.
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the most efficient results. What is the indicator as to which standard a court
is applying? If the court weighs the method and intensity of actual use of
the product against that which a reasonable consumer would have done in a
similar situation, we know the court is applying a bilateral precaution
model. If the court applies a unilateral precaution model, the level of pre-
caution is inconsequential and the court will impose strict liability without
regard to either parties' actions. I now analyze how the Montana Supreme
Court has approached products liability and whether it appears to have ap-
plied the appropriate legal standard.
III. APPLICATION OF THE ECONOMIC MODELS
Strict liability was adopted by the Montana Supreme Court in
Brandenburger v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. in which the Court ap-
plied the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A. 4 6 That Restatement pro-
vided:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably danger-
ous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physi-
cal harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property,
if (a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and (b) it
is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change
in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although (a) the seller has exer-
cised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and (b) the
user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contrac-
tual relation with the seller.'
As was noted in the introduction, the Court stated, "the doctrine of strict
liability was evolved to place liability on the party primarily responsible for
the injury occurring, that is, the manufacturer of the defective product." 48
The Court's initial rationale for adopting strict liability does not appear to
have comprehended the difference between situations of unilateral precau-
tion and bilateral precaution. Regardless, Montana's whole-hearted adop-
tion of the Restatement, the codification of the same at Mont. Code Ann.
§27-1-719, and the subsequent case law provide fertile ground to analyze
the application of products liability in Montana. The foregoing economic
models will be used to analyze the three general categories of the Montana
products liability regime: design defect, manufacturing defect, and failure to
warn. Thereafter, the affirmative defenses of misuse and assumption of the
risk will be critiqued using the same models.
46. Brandenburger, 513 P.2d at 272 (adopting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965)).
47. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A.
48. Brandenburger, 513 P.2d at 273 (citing Lechuga, 567 P.2d at 261 (Jacobsen, J., concurring)).
164 Vol. 71
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In order to establish a prima facie case in strict liability, the plaintiff
must show that the product caused the injury and that the injury occurred
because the product was defective and unreasonably dangerous. 49 Mon-
tana's strict liability statute states that "a person who sells a product in a
defective condition unreasonably dangerous to a user or consumer or to the
property of a user or consumer is liable for physical harm caused by the
product . . . ."5o As interpreted by the Montana Supreme Court, the statute
does not create a dual standard for products liability (both defective and
unreasonably dangerous).51 Instead, it only requires that the plaintiff estab-
lish that the product was defective. 5 2 Put simply, a "defective product" and
an "unreasonably dangerous product" mean the same thing; there is only
one standard, without regard to whether the standard is stated as "defective
and unreasonably dangerous" or as any other derivation.
There are two characteristics of the statute that must be mentioned
before an in-depth analysis. First, just as the Court adopted the Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 402A,53 the Legislature adopted the Court's common
law rule.5 4 Thus, the interpretations of the Restatement prior to the codifi-
cation of the Montana products liability regime are just as persuasive, all
else being equal, as those interpretations made after the codification.5 5 Sec-
ond, strict liability will not be imposed under the terms of the statute until
the plaintiff establishes that the product was "in a defective condition unrea-
sonably dangerous."5 6 Depending on whether the plaintiff is claiming de-
sign defect, manufacturing defect, or failure to warn, what constitutes a de-
fective product that is unreasonably dangerous will vary. Considering the
purpose of this article is to determine whether strict liability for products
liability in Montana is efficient, the economic analysis will focus on what
constitutes a defective product.
A. Design Defects
In Montana a design defect case can be presented in one of two ways:
one can claim that the specifications upon which the product was based
were defective,5 7 or one can claim that the consumer's expectations were
violated as a result of the defect.58 Regardless of the manner in which the
49. Schelske v Creative Nail Design, Inc., 933 P.2d 799, 803 (Mont. 1997).
50. Mont. Code Ann. § 27-1-719(2) (2009).
51. McAlpine v. Rhone-Poulenc Ag Co., 16 P.3d 1054, 1059 (Mont. 2000).
52. Id.
53. Brandenburger, 513 P.2d at 272 (adopting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A).
54. Wise v. Ford Motor Co., 943 P.2d 1310, 1312 (Mont. 1997).
55. Id. at 1312.
56. Mont. Code Ann. § 27-1-719(2).
57. Rix v. Gen. Motors Corp., 723 P.2d 195, 201 (Mont. 1986).
58. McAlpine, 16 P.3d at 1059.
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case is framed, the resolution depends on whether an alternative product
design should have been used.59 If the manufacturer should have used an
alternative design, the manufacturer will be subject to strict liability. 6 0 Both
the alternative design and consumer expectation standards deserve separate
analysis.
1. Alternative Design
In Rix v. General Motors Corp., the Court identified a series of factors
that would need to be balanced in order to determine whether a product was
defective.6' In Rix, the plaintiff was injured when he was hit by a General
Motors Corporation ("GMC") truck.6 2 The truck had been equipped with a
water tank after GMC had sold it to an automobile dealer.63 The parties
stipulated that a brake failure caused the collision.6" GMC manufactured
trucks of the same model with one of two types of brake systems: a single
brake system and a dual brake system, the latter providing more braking
power than the former. 65 The dual brake system was only equipped on
trucks when the purchaser elected to have it attached at an additional cost.6 6
The plaintiff claimed that if the dual brake system had been equipped, the
accident would not have been as severe or it would not have occurred.67
For that reason, the plaintiff asserted that the dual brake system should have
been mandated.68 In essence, the plaintiff argued the single brake system
design was defective because a better system-the dual brake system-
existed when the product was placed in the stream of commerce. Prior to
this case, the Court had yet to articulate a clear set of criteria to analyze
alternative design cases. Here, however, the Court held that various factors
must be balanced by the jury to determine whether the manufacturer should
be subject to strict liability.69 The Court added that not all factors would be
necessary in every case and that the jury should consider alternative and
additional factors as different facts and circumstances dictated.70 The fac-
tors the Court found most applicable (hereinafter the Rix Test) for the case
at hand were:
59. Rix, 723 P.2d at 201.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 197.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Rir, 723 P.2d at 198.
66. Id.
67. 1L
68. Id.
69. Id. at 201.
70. Id
166 Vol. 71
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(a) The reasonable probability that the product as originally designed would
cause serious harm to the claimant.
(b) Consideration of the reasonable probability of harm from the use of the
original product as compared to the reasonable probability of harm from the
use of the product with the alternative design.
(c) The technological feasibility of an alternative design that would have pre-
vented claimant's harm.
(d) The relative costs both to the manufacturer and the consumer of produc-
ing, distributing and selling the original product as compared to the product
with the alternative design.
(e) The time reasonably required to implement the alternative design.7 '
The Court remanded the case to determine whether, under the foregoing
factors, the product was "unreasonably dangerous because a safer alterna-
tive design was available to the manufacturer." 7 2
Although this case was remanded, it illustrates how the Court applies
its strict liability standard. There was no question that the plaintiff had been
injured.73 If the case were decided in terms of strict liability, plainly inter-
preted, the plaintiff should have recovered immediately; instead, the Court
adopted a different rule.7 4 First, according to the five Rix factors, a jury
determines whether the product was defective and unreasonably danger-
ous. 5 If the product is defective and unreasonably dangerous, the Court
applies strict liability.76
Interestingly, it appears there is a contradiction in the standards used to
prosecute a design defect case. Products liability cases have long been
lauded for applying a pure strict liability standard; but, the above factors
appear to insert a reasonableness standard in determining whether the prod-
uct was defective and unreasonably dangerous. How does one reconcile the
commingling of the two standards? Giving due consideration to the differ-
ences between bilateral precaution and unilateral precaution, the answer be-
comes clear. The Court is trying to determine, in essence, who could have
avoided the injury.
Design defect cases usually involve durable products.77 For example,
a consumer purchases a snowmobile, a durable product, and understands
that it is meant to drive on snow. Once the products are in the hands of the
consumer, the probability of an accident depends upon the method and in-
71. Rix, 723 P.2d at 201-202.
72. Id. at 202.
73. Id.
74. Brown v. N. Am. Mfg. Co., 576 P.2d 711, 717 (Mont. 1978).
75. Id. at 718.
76. Id. at 716.
77. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, A Positive Economic Analysis of Products Liability,
14 J. Leg. Stud. 535, 554 (1985).
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tensity of use of the durable product.78 These products are typically mar-
keted with a particular purpose that is partially dictated by price. A snow-
mobile is not designed to drive on water, and, if it were, it would be mark-
edly more expensive. When consumers use products in a manner the
manufacturer could not reasonably foresee and bring a claim that an alterna-
tive design-presumably one that would have accommodated the manner in
which the product was used-should have been used, the Court will look to
the reasonableness of the design relative to the intended use in determining
whether the product was defective and unreasonably dangerous. 79 If the
snowmobile consumer claims that a water accommodating design should
have been used in manufacturing the snowmobile, the Court will determine
whether the manufacturer was reasonable in not using an alternative design
that could have adapted the product to that method and intensity of use. In
other words, the issue is whether the manufacturer was in the best position
to avoid the injury, given the facts and circumstances surrounding the sale
of the product, or was the plaintiff remiss in using the product without a
sufficient level of precaution? The Court does not blindly inquire as to
whether the product caused the injury but instead adopts a two-step process:
Was the design reasonable and, if not, should the manufacturer be subject to
strict liability?so
Although it appears that two diametrically opposed standards are being
applied-negligence and strict liability-the two-step analysis the Court
has used is likely to lead to efficient outcomes. The determination as to
whether the product was defective and unreasonably dangerous is rightfully
subject to a negligence standard. In terms of the social cost function for the
manufacturer, the first element of the Rix Test listed above, (a), represents
p(x)A. The Court would like to know the probability of an injury occurring
with the original design or original level of precaution. Presumably, the
Court will not ignore the method and intensity of use for which that product
was designed and marketed. Additionally, the Court is consciously chang-
ing the level of precaution, x. The Court wants to know what the alternative
levels of precaution could be, or in the terminology of the Court, what pro-
posed alternative designs exist. But the Court is also asking, how would the
consumer have used the product at each level of available precaution? This
analysis is done to determine if each party is capable of producing an effi-
cient level of precaution, given that the consumer's level of precaution is
dependent upon the manufacturer's.
The Court also inquires as to the costs of producing the different levels
of precaution. Factor (d) of the Rix Test asks what the cost of production
78. Id.
79. Rix, 723 P.2d at 201-202.
80. Brown, 576 P.2d at 716-718.
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would have been in terms of dollars, while more interestingly, factor(e) of
the Rix Test asks what the cost of the product would be in terms of time.8'
As was noted above, price to some degree dictates the terms of use; the
consumer should have known that he was buying the low-end version as
opposed to the all-purpose version, i.e., a Ford Escort versus a tank.
Notably absent from the five Rix Test factors is the cost of the injury.
This, however, will be addressed later in the court proceedings as the sever-
ity of injury is a question of fact for the jury. 82 The degree of damage
caused by the tortfeasor has nothing to do with the determination of who
had the burden to avoid injury or who failed to use reasonable care.
It is important to note that the alternative design analysis is not limited
to whether the manufacturer could have produced a different product. 83
The Court wants to know if the product could have elicited the appropriate
amount of precaution from the consumer. 84 If the product could not have
elicited sufficient precaution, the manufacturer will be subject to strict lia-
bility.8 5 Again, from an economics perspective, the Court's analysis has the
potential to lead to an efficient solution because the Court recognizes that
the pivotal determination is whether both the manufacturer and consumer
could have prevented the accident. For example, if a consumer brought a
claim for design defect against a wrench manufacturer because the wrench
injured the consumer while the consumer was using the wrench as a ham-
mer, the burden would be on the consumer to establish that it was unreason-
able for the wrench manufacturer to design the wrench in such a way that it
could not be operated safely as a hammer.86 In the manufacturer's defense,
it would need to establish that the alternative design would have been cost
prohibitive for the typical consumer. 7 It is always possible to make a prod-
uct safer; the question in a design defect case is whether it was more effi-
cient for the consumer to use a hammer instead of a wrench.88
Thus, the Court is implicitly asking lawyers to analyze the problem in
terms of the social cost function. Presumably, if the product could not have
elicited the appropriate amount of precaution, the product will be deemed
defective and unreasonably dangerous. That determination would then lead
to the application of strict liability because the consumer could not have
avoided the injury. On its face, the Montana alternative design claim ap-
81. Rix, 723 P.2d at 202.
82. 25A C.J.S. Damages § 343 (2009).
83. Rix, 723 P.2d at 200.
84. Id. at 201 (citing Unif. Prod. Liab. Act § 104B (1979)).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 201-202.
87. Id.
88. Cooter & Ulen, supra n. 2, at 365.
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pears to be efficient-or at least has the potential to lead to efficient out-
comes. Actual application of the rule, however, may have varying results.
2. Consumer Expectations
Instead of an alternative design inquiry, a court could determine if the
product was in a defective condition because it was unreasonably danger-
ous. Under the unreasonably dangerous standard, a court compares the ac-
tual outcome with that of what the consumer expected the outcome to be. 8 9
While the Montana Supreme Court has furnished decisions using both stan-
dards, it has yet to establish when one standard will be applied over the
other.
The Court in McAlpine v. Rhone-Poulenc Ag Company held the deter-
mination of whether a product is unreasonably dangerous is based on "prov-
ing that it is 'capable of causing injury to the user beyond that which would
be expected by the ordinary user."' 90 There, the plaintiffs asserted that the
herbicide produced by the defendant caused severe crop damage that could
not have been foreseen by the plaintiffs nor any other ordinary consumer. 9'
The defendants admitted that the herbicide had a propensity to cause dam-
age under the conditions the plaintiffs experienced and admitted the herbi-
cide was in fact the cause of the crop damage experienced by the plain-
tiffs. 9 2 The issue presented to the Court was whether the language "defec-
tive condition unreasonably dangerous" could be misleading for a juror.93
Although the Court did not directly address the application of consumer
expectations, comparing the Court's dicta on consumer expectations with
the rule in Rix reveals that strict liability is not applied unless the plaintiff
establishes the product was in a defective condition with respect to the
method and intensity of use of an ordinary user.
In terms of economics, the Court is asking whether the injury could
have been avoided by the consumer. If the reasonable consumer would
have expected the outcome, then the reasonable consumer would have
avoided it. Again, the Court is implicitly making the determination of
whether the manner in which the product was consumed should have dic-
tated unilateral precaution or bilateral precaution. If the injury caused by
the product was outside the average consumer's expectations, the Court im-
poses strict liability because the manufacturer would have been the only
party in a position to avoid the injury. But if the jury finds that an ordinary
89. McAlpine, 16 P.3d at 1059.
90. Id. (citations omitted).
91. Id. at 1056.
92. Id. at 1057.
93. Id.
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consumer should have expected the type of injury caused by the product, 94
the Court will not impose strict liability as consumers have an obligation to
avoid injury in instances of bilateral precaution. If the Court were to hold
otherwise, it would essentially be imposing absolute liability, and that is not
the Court's intent.95 "If the manufacturer were liable for any and every
injury that could have been avoided by a different design, consumers would
have less incentive either to take care or to alter their activity level, for they
would know they would be compensated for their injury."9 6
As a result, the Court will apparently make a determination that the
product is in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous when the ex-
pected accident costs, p(x)A, are substantially greater than the internal costs
the manufacturer incurred, wx. There is a prima facie question of fact as to
whether the situation was that of bilateral precaution. If a court does not
find that strict liability should be applied, the consumer acted unreasonably
in incurring an injury because the manufacturer has internalized the external
costs of the product. Alternatively, if a court determines that strict liability
should be imposed, the court is implicitly stating that the manufacturer, and
only the manufacturer, should have taken greater precaution and decreased
p(x). As can be seen by the rule adopted by the Court in McAlpine, the
determination of whether the product is in a defective condition unreasona-
bly dangerous is made by inquiring what the ordinary consumer would ex-
pect the product to do.97 If the Court adheres to this standard, the rule has
the potential to lead to efficient outcomes, as it properly distinguishes be-
tween situations of bilateral and unilateral precaution.
B. Manufacturing Defect
The second category of products liability is manufacturing defect.
Manufacturing defect varies significantly from design defect in that "a de-
fectively manufactured product is flawed because it is misconstructed with-
out regard to whether the intended design of the manufacturer was safe or
not." 9 8 Whereas a defectively designed product was made in conformity
with the specified plans of the manufacturer, the manufacturing defect re-
sults "from some mishap in the manufacturing process itself, improper
workmanship, or because defective materials were used in construction."99
"The consumer can do nothing at a reasonable cost, in the short or the long
94. Id. at 1059.
95. McJunkin v. Kaufinan & Broad Home Sys. Inc., 748 P.2d 910, 918 (Mont. 1987).
96. Landes & Posner, supra n. 77, at 554.
97. McAlpine, 16 P. 3d at 1059.
98. Rix, 723 P.2d at 200 (citing Caprara v. Chrysler Corp., 417 N.E.2d 545, 552 (1981)).
99. McJunkin, 748 P.2d at 918 (citing Rix, 723 P.2d at 200).
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run, to prevent the accident."H" If consumers cannot prevent manufactur-
ing defect accidents, manufacturers should have a propensity to settle out of
court. As evidence of this, relatively few manufacturing defect cases are
brought to court or appealed,' 0' and accordingly, few cases discuss the rule
in detail.10 2
For example, in Wood v. Old Trapper Taxi, the defendants purchased a
ham radio tower from James Kozora, who had transported the tower from
Ohio to Helena.10 3 Kozora had purchased the tower in a used condition
from the manufacturer.104 The defendants hired the plaintiff to construct
the tower; during construction, the plaintiff was injured when the tower
collapsed. 05 The plaintiff alleged that the collapse was due to the failure of
one of the legs.' 0 6 The plaintiff further alleged that the failed leg was rein-
forced by the manufacturer, at its facility, with a welded piece of plumbing
pipe.10 7 The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the defen-
dant manufacturer, finding that because the failed leg was no longer availa-
ble and the expert testimony conflicted as to whether a defect existed, the
plaintiffs "were unable to prove that the tower was defective when it left the
defendants' control." 08 On appeal, the Court held the central question was
"whether the product [was] flawed due to improper construction" in terms
of the manufacturing defect claim.109 Because of the conflicting testimony
and evidence regarding whether the leg alterations were made by the manu-
facturer, the Court reversed summary judgment and remanded the case for
trial. 110 The Court's analysis was focused on whether there was a defect in
the product when it left the hands of the manufacturer, for if there was, the
defendant would be subject to strict liability.I'
Strict liability for manufacturing defect is a straightforward proposi-
tion in Montana. The Court defines manufacturing defects as "imperfec-
tions that inevitably occur in a typically small percentage of products of a
given design as a result of the fallibility of the manufacturing process."' 12
The Court does not make a determination as to whether the consumer could
100. Id. at 555.
101. Id. at 564.
102. William 0. Bronson, Developments in Montana Products Liability Low, 1977-1987, 48 Mont.
L. Rev. 297, 299 (1987).
103. Wood v. Old Trapper Taxi, 952 P.2d 1375, 1377 (Mont. 1997).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1377-1378.
106. Id. at 1378.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Wood, 952 P.2d at 1379.
110. Id. at 1381.
111. Id. at 1379.
112. Id. at 1379-1380 (citing Rix, 723 P.2d 195).
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have avoided the injury, nor is there any discussion involving the method or
intensity of use. Instead, the Court only wants to know if the product was
flawed. This indicates the Court is not applying the bilateral precaution
model. In cases of manufacturing defect, the party in the best position to
avert injury is the manufacturer. The Montana Supreme Court's application
of strict liability should result in efficient outcomes.
C. Failure to Warn
A third manner in which a product can be deemed defective and unrea-
sonably dangerous is when the manufacturer fails to warn the consumer of a
danger.' 13 The Court has held that, "A failure to warn of an injury causing
risk associated with use of a technically pure and fit product can render
such product unreasonably dangerous."" 4 Thus, just as with a manufactur-
ing defect, the design can be reasonable and, as in an alternative design
case, the product can be built exactly to specification. In such case, if the
manufacturer fails to warn the consumer about a potentially hazardous dan-
ger, the product will be deemed defective.' 15 The basic idea is that if there
is a potential hazard that the reasonable consumer would not expect, the
producer may have a duty to warn the consumer." 6 If the manufacturer
breaches its duty to warn, the product will be deemed defective and unrea-
sonably dangerous, thus invoking strict liability."' 7
In Wise v. Ford Motor Co., the plaintiff drove his Ford Escort into a
mechanical car wash and when the spray of water from one of the pres-
surized water jets hit the driver's side window, the window exploded into
the car and injured the plaintiff."8 Plaintiff presented evidence during trial
that Ford Motor Company knew that windows in the 1981-1990 Escort
could explode when exposed to sudden pressure changes, the likes of which
occur in mechanical car washes, and "deliberately decided not to warn con-
sumers of this danger."' '9 The plaintiff used this evidence as the basis for
his failure to warn claim; that is, there was a danger of exploding windows
that he could not have reasonably foreseen and the manufacturer knew of
the danger. 12 0
113. Id. at. 1382.
114. Brown, 576 P.2d at 719 (citing Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir.
1968)).
115. Wise, 943 P.2d at 1314.
116. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A cmt. j.
117. Brown, 576 P.2d at 718-719.
118. Wise, 943 P.2d at 1312.
119. Id. at 1314.
120. Id.
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The Court acknowledged that Ford knew its windows had the potential
to occasionally break in car washes, but the Court upheld the jury verdict
that found the costs associated with warning the user would outweigh the
benefit derived by the user of the window design.121 The Court stated, "Al-
though Wise presented evidence that Ford knew that its Escort windows
occasionally broke in car washes, both experts [for both the plaintiff and
defendant] testified that a warning was inappropriate for this type of
risk."122 In essence, the Court agreed with the testimony of the defendant's
expert who could not see how a warning "would have done an awful lot of
good."123
Thus, Wise shows that while the manufacturer has a duty to warn of
potentially dangerous products, that duty is subject to a reasonableness stan-
dard.12 4 The Court will weigh a series of case-specific factors, including
whether the danger was open and obvious 25 and what the prevailing indus-
try standards were 2 6 in determining whether a warning was warranted.12 7
This suggests that when information is not readily attainable by the con-
sumer-or is only attainable by exerting great effort-and the potential
harm is significant-the duty to warn falls to the party who can act more
easily to avoid the harm. In the case of products with potentially harmful
ingredients, for example, that party is the manufacturer because without a
warning (an ingredient list) each consumer would need to perform a chemi-
cal analysis on the products in order to determine if the product contained
any potentially harmful ingredients.12 8
Further promoting efficient outcomes, Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 402A assures defendants that where a warning is given, it can be reasona-
bly assumed that it will be read and heeded.' 29 Here again, the duty is
placed on the individual who can most efficiently avoid injury. Once the
consumer is provided with the necessary information, the burden of liability
for harm is shifted from the manufacturer to the consumer.
Finally, the Montana Pattern Jury Instructions state the rule: "the de-
fendant sold the product in a defective condition because of a failure to
adequately warn of those dangers which would not be readily recognized by
the ordinary user of the product."13 0 Liability revolves around the availabil-
121. Id. at 1315.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Wise, 943 P.2d at 1314.
125. Brown 576 P.2d at 717.
126. Id. at 718.
127. Tacke v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 713 P.2d 527, 535 (Mont. 1986) (citations omitted).
128. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A cmt. b.
129. Id. at § 402A cmt. j.
130. Mont. Pattern Jury Instr. § 7.04 (2d ed. 2003) (emphasis added).
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ity of pertinent information-that is, information that would enable the con-
sumer to avoid injury from dangers that the consumer would not readily
recognize. The information's importance is a function of the cost of the
information and the potential harm from which the information will protect
the consumer. It is evident, therefore, that the Court is applying a bilateral
precaution model.
Wood and snippets of strict liability history illustrate that the jury must
consider whether the danger necessitated a warning.131 This question of
fact, in turn, is based upon what a reasonable person would be able to de-
duce from the product. Stated in the form of the social cost function ex-
plained above, the amount of information provided would be x and the po-
tential of harm, p(x), given the amount of information provided, A, is p(x)A.
The duty to warn will be determined by weighing the information costs, w,
associated with identifying the danger and the potential injury to the user
with and without the warning. Once again, when p(x)A is greater than wx,
the producer has the responsibility to provide further warnings.
In Wise, the Court upheld the jury's determination, based on the testi-
mony of the defendant, that adding a warning would have provided the
consumer with little to no additional protection from the potential injury.132
It would have thus been unreasonable to require the defendant to warn of a
danger when the warning would have been of no beneficial use to the con-
sumer. As a result, the Court determined that an additional unit of x, which
is costly for the manufacturer, would not have significantly decreased the
probability of an injury, p(x), thereby making additional warnings unreason-
able.
While the common law in Montana is fairly sparse as to failure to warn
(or at least as to the application of the rule), it appears that Montana's inter-
pretation of failure to warn has the potential to create efficient outcomes.
The determination of whether the product was unreasonably dangerous is
the condition precedent to applying strict liability. 3 3 The question as to
whether the manufacturer needs to warn is similar to that of an alternative
design inquiry in that it subjects manufacturers to a reasonableness stan-
dard. The manufacturer will be subject to strict liability upon determining
the need for a warning and the failure to warn. In economic terms, once it
has been determined that the manufacturer could have avoided the accident
at the lowest cost, the manufacturer will be held strictly liable to the extent
of the total social costs.
131. Wood, 952 P.2d at 1382-1383.
132. Wise, 943 P.2d at 1314.
133. Id. at 1312.
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D. Affirmative Defenses
A defendant has two affirmative defenses to products liability in Mon-
tana: misuse of a product and assumption of the risk.134 Both defenses are
based on the idea that the consumer had the ability and opportunity to avoid
the risk of injury at the lowest cost. Whereas alternative design, manufac-
turing defect, and failure to warn claims appear to have the necessary
framework to result in efficient outcomes, the affirmative defenses appear
to have a relatively low probability of reaching the same result. Further-
more, the Montana Legislature would be well served to do away with both
affirmative defenses as a result of the Court's interpretation of these rules.
The affirmative defense of misuse of a product will first be analyzed, fol-
lowed then by an analysis of assumption of the risk.
1. Misuse of a Product
In Lutz v. National Crane Corp., the plaintiffs husband, Lutz, died
from injuries incurred while working with a crane. 35 Lutz and his supervi-
sor were instructed to retrieve a load of pipes that had spilled off of a semi-
trailer.13 6 The pipes had rolled into a position such that they were below
overhead power lines.' 3 7 Lutz was aware he would be electrocuted if the
power lines came in contact with the crane cable he used to retrieve the
pipes.' 3 8 After selecting only the pipes he and his co-worker believed could
be removed safely, Lutz positioned the crane above the pipes so that the
cable of the crane could drag the pipes up the incline to the road.' 39 The
cable of the crane nonetheless came into contact with the power line and
Lutz was fatally electrocuted.14 0
Lutz's estate brought a products liability claim against the manufac-
turer of the crane alleging "that the crane-absent an insulated link-was
defectively designed and unreasonably dangerous." 1 4 1 The defendant
raised the affirmative defense of misuse of the product, arguing that Lutz
had "used the crane in an improper manner by sideloading, or dragging the
load, from beneath the power lines."1 4 2 It was undisputed that Lutz used
the side-loading method. 143 The defense claimed that Lutz's misuse of the
134. Mont. Code Ann. § 27-1-719(5).
135. Lutz v. Natl. Crane Corp., 884 P.2d 455, 457 (Mont. 1994).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Lutz, 884 P.2d at 457.
142. Id. at 458.
143. Id.
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product was the sole cause of the accident because the accident would not
have occurred had he operated the equipment in the appropriate manner.'44
The defense, in essence, asserted that a manufacturer should not be liable
for any unintended use that was not reasonably foreseeable.14 5 The Court
agreed with the defendant's characterization of when the affirmative de-
fense of misuse is available; the Court disagreed, however, as to the defini-
tion of "unreasonable misuse."1 4 6 The Court reasoned that the legislature
must have used the terms "unreasonable" and "misuse" purposefully.147
The Court held that when the misuse was reasonable, the affirmative de-
fense could not be asserted.14 8 The Court then stated that when "the manu-
facturer reasonably foresees that its product can be misused in a certain
fashion-that is, the offending misuse is 'reasonable'-then the manufac-
turer does not have the benefit of a defense which exonerates or mitigates
its breach of duty and its wrongful conduct in failing to design out or guard
against the defect."' 4 9 Based upon the fact that the defendant admitted that
sideloading was a reasonably foreseeable misuse, it was not allowed to rely
on the defense of unreasonable misuse.'50
To assert the affirmative defense of misuse of a product, adefendant
must establish three elements: first, that the injured party unreasonably mis-
used the product; second, that the misuse was not reasonably foreseeable by
the manufacturer; and third, that the misuse caused the injury.' 5 ' Notably,
the essential inquiry under the second element is whether the use was rea-
sonably foreseeable by the manufacturer and not whether the use was "ab-
normal or unintended."1 5 2 Because a manufacturer can reasonably foresee
a near infinite number of unreasonable misuses of its products, it will rarely
be able to use the affirmative defense of misuse.
Particularly troubling with the analysis adopted by the Court is the
redundancy it causes within the products liability framework. The first ele-
ment for a determination that a product is defective and unreasonably dan-
gerous in an alternative design case is a determination of "the reasonable
probability that the product as originally designed would cause serious
harm to the claimant."1 5 3 Such a determination necessarily involves evi-
dence of whether the manufacturer could reasonably foresee the types of
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 459.
147. Lutz, 884 P.2d at 459-460.
148. Id. at 460.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 459 (citing Hart-Albin, 870 P.2d at 53-54).
152. Hart-Albin, 870 P.2d at 53-54 (citing American Law of Products Liability, vol. 3, § 42:8 (T.
Travers ed., 3d ed., Laws. Coop. Pubig. Co. 1987).
153. Rix, 723 P.2d at 201.
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use or misuse at question. The Lutz holding therefore creates a redundancy
in analysis between whether a product is defective and whether the affirma-
tive defense of misuse is applicable.
In addition, as to failure to warn, the Montana Pattern Jury Instructions
suggest that a product is defective and unreasonably dangerous if the manu-
facturer has failed to "adequately warn of those dangers which would not be
readily recognized by the ordinary user of the product."154 Here again, the
failure to warn analysis includes a determination of whether the manufac-
turer could reasonably foresee the type of use or misuse in question. The
redundancy in the analysis of the standards indicates that the efficacy of the
misuse affirmative defense as a separate standard is questionable. In fact,
that very argument has been addressed by the Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Products Liability § 2: "It follows that misuse, modification, and alteration
are not discrete legal issues. Rather, when relevant, they are aspects of the
concepts of defect, causation, and plaintiffs fault."155
The foreseeability analysis has the potential to confuse juries because
it requires a jury to apply the same criteria for both alternative design/fail-
ure to warn and misuse and it distorts the jury's proper role of shifting the
burden of liability to the party that could have most efficiently avoided the
injury. As to the latter, the foreseeability requirement shifts a dispropor-
tionate amount of the focus onto the actions or knowledge of the defendant.
The critical question is which party should bear the burden of liability so as
to achieve an efficient outcome? From an economic point of view, that
question can only be answered by asking what the defendant could foresee
and whether the additional precaution necessary to avoid the foreseeable
misuse would have resulted in a lower total social cost.
An example illustrating the problem created by the focus on reasona-
ble foreseeability is found in Hart-Albin Co. v. McLees Inc.15 6 There, the
defense provided an example that using a lawnmower as a hedge trimmer
would constitute using something other than for its intended purpose.' 57 In
this example, the defense would not be able to establish the lawnmower was
misused if the manufacturer had so much as contemplated the use. Again,
as was noted in Lutz, the question is not whether the use was abnormal.
The defendant would need to establish that it could not have reasonably
foreseen this type of misuse. For example, the defendant would be barred
from using the affirmative defense of misuse for any danger of which it has
warned the consumer. The question should not be whether the misuse was
foreseeable but whether the misuse was reasonable. This would allow a
154. Mont. Pattern Jury Instr. § 7.04.
155. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 2 cmt. p (1998).
156. Hart-Albin, 870 P.2d 51.
157. Id. at 53.
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jury to weigh the actions and subsequent costs of both parties and make a
decisions based upon who had the ability to avoid the danger. Instead, be-
cause of the misuse statute in Montana, the focus is on the defendant's
knowledge, even if the consumer/plaintiff could have easily avoided the
injury. This may result in unintended outcomes.
In sum, the misuse defense as interpreted in Lutz has the potential to
result in inefficient outcomes for two reasons. First, the analysis of misuse
invites an unnecessary redundancy that can only serve to confuse the trier
of fact. The analysis as to whether a particular use or misuse was reasona-
bly foreseeable by the manufacturer will be made for alternative design and
failure to warn claims. Requiring a jury to revisit the same analysis at the
affirmative defense level may suggest that each analysis of foreseeability
and reasonableness should be different.
Second, the rule rewards unnecessary risks taken by the consumer and
creates a perverse incentive for manufacturers. Consumers will not have an
incentive to take due care where it is relatively more efficient for them to do
so because any misuse that is reasonably foreseeable by the manufacturer
may result in strict liability. Furthermore, if we assume that manufacturers
can foresee most uses of their products, most uses of the products will nec-
essarily be misuses. Additionally, manufacturers may be induced to pro-
duce the "idiot proof' product at a significant cost to the consumer or be-
come knowingly ignorant of potential dangers.' 5 8 An example of such a
product could be a Ford Escort reinforced with the safety features of a tank
as a result of the manufacturer foreseeing that a window could explode if it
came into contact with a high pressure stream of water. As a result, because
the current law does not dictate that the party who can more efficiently
avoid the accident be held liable for such inaction, Montana has created an
inefficient rule that has the potential of spawning irrational behavior.
Whether the incentives are perverse or the rule is confusing, the results of
the rule will still be inefficient in terms of an economic analysis.
2. Assumption of the Risk
The second affirmative defense, assumption of the risk, is founded in
the consumer's observations of the dangers inherent in the product. 59 In
order to establish assumption of the risk statutorily, the defendant must
prove two elements: first, that the consumer discovered the defect, or the
defect was open and obvious and, second, that the consumer unreasonably
made use of the product.16 0 The Court, however, requires more than what
158. Landes & Posner, supra n. 77, at 562.
159. Lutz, 884 P.2d at 461.
160. Mont. Code Ann. § 27-1-719(5)(a).
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is statutorily mandated, and as a result, the rule does not promote efficient
levels of precaution.
Lutz explains the application, both statutorily and under common law,
of Montana's assumption of the risk doctrine. As to the first element, the
Court determined that for plaintiffs to have assumed the risk, they must
have had subjective knowledge of the defect.16 1 In order for the plaintiff to
satisfy the first statutory element, there must be evidence that the injured
party was actually aware of the danger posed by the defective product. The
Court is interested in "what the particular plaintiff sees, knows, understands
and appreciates." 6 2 In Lutz, the Court found that in order for the affirma-
tive defense to bar recovery, the plaintiff had to have personal knowledge
that if the crane's cable came in contact with a power line he would suffer
serious injury or death.163 The knowledge requirement is not that of a rea-
sonable person exposed to similar circumstances; instead, it is what the in-
jured party actually knew.
As to the second element, unreasonably making use of a product, the
Court interpreted unreasonable use in an interesting way. The Court bor-
rowed from its previous interpretation of "unreasonably misused" in inter-
preting unreasonable use." In a convoluted and incoherent fashion, the
Court reasoned that if a misuse is reasonably foreseeable, the misuse is
reasonable. 165 The Court concluded that "Since . .. sideloading was a fore-
seeable, and, hence, reasonable, though improper, use of the crane, the sec-
ond part of the defense of assumption of risk could not, as a matter of law,
be proven under the statute . . . ."166 In other words, if a use is foreseeable
it is reasonable whether or not it was a misuse. Thus, in Montana, if the use
of a product results in the consumer being injured, and that use was foresee-
able by the manufacturer, then the affirmative defenses of assumption of the
risk and misuse will be foreclosed. The most troubling aspect of this con-
clusion is that the Court finds a perfect correlation between foreseeability
and reasonableness.
Appropriately, and surprisingly, the Montana Pattern Jury Instructions
differ from the Lutz decision even though the Lutz rule has never been over-
turned. The Montana Pattern Jury Instructions provide:
Assumption of risk is a defense to a strict liability claim. In order to establish
assumption of risk, the defendant must prove:
161. Lutz, 884 P.2d at 461.
162. Id. (citing Krueger v. Gen. Motors Corp., 783 P.2d 1340, 1347 (Mont. 1989)).
163. Id. (citing Krueger, 783 P.2d at 1347).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 462.
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First, that the defect was open and obvious or the plaintiff discovered the
product defect; Second, that even though the defect was open and obvious, or
the plaintiff discovered the defect, the plaintiff unreasonably made use of the
product; and Third, that the plaintiff was injured as a result of the use. 167
Notably, there is no language inquiring into whether the defendant reasona-
bly foresaw the use of its product. For purposes of an efficiency analysis
the difference is important. The assumption of the risk defense is meant to
waive liability when consumers unreasonably ignore their own ability to
avoid the risk. Under the Lutz rule, the affirmative defense is eviscerated
because of the foreseeability rule. For example, Ford can foresee that its
Mustangs will be used in drag racing. Under the Lutz rule, any accidents
caused because the Mustang was defective as a drag racer could not be
defended under assumption of the risk because Ford can foresee that its cars
will be used in drag racing. Under the interpretation in Lutz, if drag racing
is foreseeable, it is also reasonable, and if it is reasonable, the defendant
cannot invoke assumption of the risk.
The same two issues arise under assumption of the risk as arose under
misuse: the Court is forcing the jury to undergo a redundant analysis, and
the Court is too focused on the defendant's ability to foresee the misuse. As
assumption of the risk is currently interpreted, a consumer is not required to
take a minimum level of precaution. An economic analysis would require a
prima facie determination of which party was in the best position to avoid
the danger instead of inquiring into what the defendant foresaw at the ex-
clusion of investigating the reasonableness of all the parties' actions.
The Lutz rule creates a perverse incentive. The incentives for the "id-
iot proof' product and the knowingly ignorant manufacturer are equally
present under the assumption of the risk affirmative defense as they are
under the misuse affirmative defense. On a practical level, Why would pro-
ducers offer their wares to Montana when they can be liable for any fore-
seeable use of its articles of commerce? The rules of alternative design and
failure to warn do have the ability to act as "reasonableness filters" that
allow defendants to argue the reasonableness of their choices without hav-
ing to resort to the affirmative defenses. The Montana Pattern Jury Instruc-
tions seem to have ignored this anomaly in the common law. Under the
rule as written in the Instructions, the affirmative defense seems to be more
efficient.
The second problem is the redundancy of analysis. Once again, what
the manufacturer knew in terms of how its product would be used is ana-
lyzed twice. As was noted in misuse, a determination of what the defen-
dant/manufacturer could have reasonably foreseen should be placed in alter-
native design or failure to warn. As the affirmative defense of assumption
167. Mont. Pattern Jury Instr. § 7.05.
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of the risk has been interpreted, it cannot lead to efficient results because
the consumer will not be required to provide an efficient level of precau-
tion. Stated differently, the consumer will not have to exert a reasonable
amount of precaution.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Montana Supreme Court in Brandenburger adopted the products
liability regime in an attempt to place liability on the party responsible for
the injury occurring.' 68 The present day application of strict liability in
torts would perhaps disappoint the Brandenburger Court because liability
does not automatically accrue to the manufacturer. The determination of
whether a product is defective currently has the potential to shift the burden
of liability onto the consumer or the manufacturer depending upon their
respective abilities to avoid the injury. The party that can most easily avoid
the injury must do so if it desires to avoid liability under Montana's inter-
pretation of products liability. As a result, alternative design, manufactur-
ing defect, and failure to warn have the potential to result in efficient out-
comes.
But there are two glaring exceptions to Montana's exemplary analysis
and application of strict liability: misuse and assumption of the risk. These
two rules do little more than automatically shift liability onto the defendant.
The defendant is thereby forced to rely on the analysis of whether or not a
product is defective by way of alternative design, manufacturing defect, or
failure to warn. The affirmative defense rules give consumers no incentive
to take an appropriate amount of precaution, and give manufacturers an
incentive to produce an excessive amount of precaution or to turn a blind
eye to possible misuses of their products.
168. Brandenburger, 513 P.2d at 273 (citing Lechuga, 467 P.2d at 261 (Jacobsen, J., concurring)).
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